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Virtual milgram: empathic concern or personal distress?
Evidence from functional MRI and dispositional measures
Abstract
One motive for behaving as the agent of another's aggression appears to be anchored in as yet
unelucidated mechanisms of obedience to authority. In a recent partial replication of Milgram's
obedience paradigm within an immersive virtual environment, participants administered pain to a
female virtual human and observed her suffering. Whether the participants' response to the latter was
more akin to other-oriented empathic concern for her well-being or to a self-oriented aversive state of
personal distress in response to her distress is unclear. Using the stimuli from that study, this
event-related fMRI-based study analysed brain activity during observation of the victim in pain versus
not in pain. This contrast revealed activation in pre-defined brain areas known to be involved in
affective processing but not in those commonly associated with affect sharing (e.g., ACC and insula).
We then examined whether different dimensions of dispositional empathy predict activity within the
same pre-defined brain regions: While personal distress and fantasy (i.e., tendency to transpose oneself
into fictional situations and characters) predicted brain activity, empathic concern and perspective taking
predicted no change in neuronal response associated with pain observation. These exploratory findings
suggest that there is a distinct pattern of brain activity associated with observing the pain-related
behaviour of the victim within the context of this social dilemma, that this observation evoked a
self-oriented aversive state of personal distress, and that the objective "reality" of pain is of secondary
importance for this response. These findings provide a starting point for experimentally more rigorous
investigation of obedience.
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2006). One form of social interaction in which both empathy and 
personal distress may fi gure prominently is that played out in the 
obedience paradigm (Milgram, 1963). This paradigm induces a 
social dilemma in which participants feel impelled to act in com-
pliance with the experimenter’s commands to administer pain to 
another person while at the same time feeling driven to avoid  causing 
harm. Slater et al. (2006) recently brought the obedience paradigm 
to ‘virtual’ life in a study using virtual reality (VR)  technology. The 
motivation for the study was to examine the experience of pres-
ence in VR (for an overview of presence, see e.g., Sanchez-Vives 
and Slater, 2005). The study participants experienced discomfort 
and increased arousal over the course of the confl ict, and some 
participants expressed the desire to discontinue or did actually 
stop applying pain to the distressed avatar. In view of the implicit 
assumption of Milgram’s social dilemma that the participant is 
motivated to minimise interpersonal confl ict, the implication of 
Slater et al.’s study is that the VR-based dilemma was transiently 
experienced by the participants as in some way real, and this despite 
the fact that the participants were left in no doubt that the avatar 
and her pain do not exist in the real world. It is however unclear 
whether the participants’ affective experience during the confl ict 
was more closely associated with empathic concern for the welfare 
of the avatar or with an aversive state of personal distress.
INTRODUCTION
The capacity for empathy is a fundamental aspect of effective 
 functioning in interpersonal situations. The general view is that 
empathy involves the ability to share the affective state of another 
person (e.g., Decety and Jackson, 2004). Neuroimaging research 
into the mechanisms underlying affect sharing has grown in 
recent years, especially in connection with empathy for pain (e.g., 
Botvinick et al., 2005; Jackson et al., 2005). Pain-related affect shar-
ing can lead to empathic concern for the welfare of the person 
experiencing discomfort and distress, and is thus regarded as an 
other-oriented motivated response (Batson et al., 1987; Eisenberg 
and Strayer, 1987; Eisenberg, 2000). The observation of another’s 
distress can on the other hand evoke the aversive experience of 
personal distress. This is a self-oriented motivated response (Davis, 
1980; Eisenberg and Strayer, 1987; Eisenberg, 2000) associated with 
fearfulness, uncertainty, emotional vulnerability, anxiety (Davis, 
1996), and negative affect (Batson et al., 1987). Personal distress is 
posited to refl ect empathic over-arousal (Eisenberg et al., 1994) and 
to be associated with self-regulatory effort to alleviate the aversive-
ness of this state (Batson et al., 1987, 1997).
Empathy is modulated by the interpersonal context in which 
individuals are engaged, such as competitive or co-operative inter-
play (Englis et al., 1982; Lanzetta and Englis, 1989; Singer et al., 
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this study, and the scant neuroimaging literature addressing affect 
sharing, empathy, and distress under such potentially challeng-
ing social conditions, we adopted an exploratory position with a 
view to providing preliminary fi ndings for further investigation of 
obedience. Considering that dispositional measures of empathic 
concern and distress have predicted specifi c activity in brain regions 
associated with perception of another’s pain (Singer et al., 2004, 
2006; Saarela et al., 2007; for exceptions, see Jackson et al., 2005; 
Lamm et al., 2007a), we asked whether the Empathic Concern and 
Personal Distress subscales of the Interpersonal Reactivity Index 
(Davis, 1996), a well established and often used measure of differ-
ent facets of empathic responsiveness, would predict changes in 
brain activation during the perception of the avatar’s pain-related 
behaviour. Because of the virtual nature of our stimuli, we included 
the Fantasy subscale of the IRI as a measure of the tendency to 
imaginatively transpose oneself into fi ctional situations and char-
acters (Davis, 1996).
We used functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to 
measure brain activity in healthy participants required to elicit 
virtual pain to a female avatar in a number of repeated trials within 
the context of a VR-based obedience paradigm. For this, Slater 
et al.’s virtual scenario was adapted for use in the scanner. This 
study focused on the period during which the participant observed 
the avatar’s pain in response to the application by the participant 
of an intense electric shock. The design included pain and non-
pain conditions, the former comprising trials with different lev-
els of electric shock intensity and the corresponding behavioural 
response of the avatar.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
PARTICIPANTS
16 healthy right-handed adult volunteers (all female, mean 
age = 22.8 years; SD = 1.41) with no record of neurological or 
psychiatric illness were recruited for this study. Handedness was as-
sessed with a self-rating scale (Bryden, 1970). All participants were 
students of the University of Zurich, native or fl uent speakers of 
Swiss-German or High German, and naïve about the purpose of 
the experiment. As verifi ed at debriefi ng, none of the included 
participants reported knowledge of the Milgram social dilemma 
or other aggression paradigms. Participants were informed about 
potential risks associated with magnetic resonance imaging and 
screened prior to scanning to ensure suitability for MRI. It was 
drawn clearly to the attention of all participants that withdrawal 
from the investigation was possible at any time and without hav-
ing to give a reason for doing so, and participants were explicitly 
instructed that they would be observing a computer-generated 
person (avatar) and not a real person. Written informed consent 
was obtained before participation according to the guidelines of the 
Declaration of Helsinki. Each volunteer received 60 Swiss Francs for 
participation. The study and all procedures and consent forms were 
approved by the Ethics Committee of the University of Zürich.
MATERIALS
Before receiving instructions, participants completed three ques-
tionnaires: (1) The Saarbrücker Persönlichkeitsfragebogen (SPF) 
(Paulus, 1992; German version of the Interpersonal Reactivity 
Index, Davis, 1996), which was administered to assess  dimensions 
Several brain areas have been implicated in the empathic 
response to pain (for a review, see Decety and Jackson, 2004). These 
include the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) and insula, which are 
associated with the affective-motivational component of the pain 
matrix that is also activated when a person experiences noxious 
stimulation directly (Morrison et al., 2004; Singer et al., 2004; 
Jackson et al., 2005). Changes in the hemodynamic response in 
these areas have been reported when participants receive pain or 
observe facial expressions of pain (Botvinick et al., 2005), watch 
videos of a stranger in pain (Morrison et al., 2004, 2007; Morrison 
and Downing, 2007) or view images of another person’s limbs in 
situations that could be painful (Jackson et al., 2005). ACC and 
insula have also been found to correlate with the participant’s judg-
ments of the subjective severity of pain experienced by others on 
the basis of the other’s facial pain expression (Saarela et al., 2007), 
and with dispositional measures of empathic concern (e.g., Singer 
et al., 2004).
The perception of another’s emotional state is thought to 
automatically evoke internal emotional representations of that 
state (Preston and de Waal, 2002; Decety and Jackson, 2004). 
The  involuntary nature of this process may refl ect the evolution-
ary importance of empathic experience for human survival (e.g., 
Batson et al., 1987; Davis, 1996; Preston and de Waal, 2002; Decety 
and Jackson, 2004), even to the extent that not only the direct 
observation of another person’s pain (Jackson et al., 2006; Singer 
et al., 2006) but also the perception of a signal that pain is being 
experienced is suffi cient to induce empathy-related brain activity 
(Singer et al., 2004). The perception of an avatar enduring pain 
that in the real world would represent a fundamental challenge 
to survival may well have been suffi cient in Slater et al.’s study to 
involuntarily evoke affect sharing, irrespective of the ‘reality’ of the 
pain. The immediate reality of pain may under certain circum-
stances be of secondary importance given that the perception of 
injections into an anesthetised hand known by the participants to 
be temporarily insensitive to painful stimulation can also induce 
such brain activity (Lamm et al., 2007b).
Alternatively, the participants’ affective response to the avatar 
in Slater et al.’s study may have been rooted in an aversive state of 
distress as a reactive response to the pain-related distress of the 
avatar. The observation of another person in pain frequently trig-
gers affective distress in the observer (Craig, 1968), and individuals 
are thought to be predisposed to experience another’s verbal and 
non-verbal cues of distress as aversive (Blair, 1995). This is refl ected 
in Davis’s approach to the trait of personal distress as the “ten-
dency to experience distress or discomfort in response to extreme 
distress in others” (Davis, 1994). Coping with distress involves the 
alleviation of its immediate aversiveness (Batson et al., 1997) and 
self- regulatory effort to re-establish control and goal-oriented 
behaviour (Sinha, 2001). But the very essence of the obedience 
dilemma is that participants are wedged between confl icting and 
in themselves adverse alternatives for which there is no prospect of 
establishing a personally and collectively favourable outcome.
The aim of this study was to investigate the pattern of neural 
responses evoked by the perception of the avatar’s cues of pain-
related behaviour within the context of a virtual version of the 
obedience paradigm. Given the complexity of psychological events 
in the obedience paradigm, the virtual character of the paradigm in 
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of empathic responding. Our primary interest was to use the scores 
from the Empathic Concern scale (measuring prosocial feelings 
of warmth, compassion and concern for others) and the Personal 
Distress scale (measuring self-oriented feelings of anxiety and 
discomfort in response to the distress of others). Given the vir-
tual nature of the stimuli and social dilemma, we included the IRI 
Fantasy scale (refl ecting the tendency to identify with fi ctitious 
characters). The scores from the IRI Perspective Taking scale (as 
a measure of spontaneous adoption of the psychological point 
of view of others and reasoning about their mental states) were 
also analysed. The construct validity of the original IRI scales is 
reported by Davis, 1983). The internal consistencies (alpha coef-
fi cients) of the German subscales range from 0.58 to 0.73 (Paulus, 
1992). (2) The NEO-FFI (Five-Factor Inventory) (Borkenau 
and Ostendorf, 1993; German version of the NEO-Five-Factor 
Inventory, Costa and McCrae, 1992) and (3) the ARES-Skalen 
(Hartig and Moosbrugger, 2003; based on the original BIS/BAS 
scales, Carver and White, 1994) were administered to gain addi-
tional insight into the predictive value of dispositional behaviour 
for responding in this social dilemma. The Neuroticism scale of 
the NEO-FFI was used to assess  sensitivity to negative or punish-
ment cues (e.g., McCrae and Costa, 1991; Costa and McCrae, 1992; 
Watson and Clark, 1992; Izard et al., 1993; Pickering and Gray, 
2001), such as those present in  negative social situations (Izard 
et al., 1993; Bolger and Zuckerman, 1995). The retest-stability of 
the German Neuroticism Scale is 0.80 (Borkenau and Ostendorf, 
1993). The BIS-scale (Anxiety) of the ARES-Skalen was used to 
assess anxiety in terms of behavioural inhibition  sensitivity. The 
behavioural  avoidance (or inhibition) system (BIS) was originally 
proposed by Gray, 1982) as a behavioural regulation system respon-
sive to aversive and punishing environmental cues. The BIS (like 
its counterpart, the behavioural approach system or  behavioural 
activation system) is suggested to be related to  personality (e.g., 
Fowles, 1980; Gray, 1987; Gray and McNaughton, 2000). We used 
the BIS1 (Anxiety) scale as a measure of the vulnerability to anxi-
ety in non-everyday situations. The internal consistency (alpha 
coeffi cient) of the German BIS1 subscale is 0.84 (Hartig and 
Moosbrugger, 2003).
TASK DESIGN AND PROCEDURE
Each participant was told that the task in the scanner would be 
to test the learning and memory performance of a computer-
 generated female student (avatar) in a word-pair association task 
for which the student had already memorised the words. In each 
trial, the stimulus word and the target answer of each word pair 
were presented in text on the screen above the avatar (see Figure 1 
for the timeline of pain trials in which the avatar should receive 
punishment). While both words were clearly visible to the partici-
pants, they were told that the avatar could only “see” the stimulus 
word and that upon seeing it should retrieve from memory and 
verbalise the associated target word. Because the acoustic noise of 
the scanner during image acquisition could impede comprehen-
sion of the avatar’s response, the participants were told that avatar’s 
answer would also be presented in text to the right of the target 
word and at the same time as the verbal response. For every incor-
rect answer, the participant was instructed to punish the avatar 
by pressing the appropriate button of the response box with the 
index fi nger of the right hand to deliver an electric shock. For cor-
rect answers, the participant should press the other button of the 
response box with the same fi nger. The participant was instructed 
that punishment must follow every incorrect answer, irrespective of 
how painful the electric shocks might appear to be, but not before 
the participant was absolutely clear in her mind that the press of 
the correct or incorrect button was due (i.e. that the avatar had 
150 Volt150 Volt
1.5 sec
Shock intensity
2.5-4.5 sec 
Word pair
3 secmax. 6 sec
Answer Elicit pain Observe avatar in pain
Baum  Haus             AutoBaum  Haus       AutoBaum  Haus   u  Haus  Auto
FIGURE 1 | Overview of the timeline of a typical pain trial. Each trial begins by 
indicating the shock intensity (e.g. 150 V) to be administered to the avatar if it is 
punished. To test the avatar’s memory for word-pairs that the avatar is supposed 
to have memorised beforehand, a stimulus word (e.g. Baum; engl. “tree”) and 
the associated target word (e.g. Haus; engl. “house”) are then presented. The 
participant is told that the avatar can only see the stimulus word. In the pain trials, 
the avatar appears to consider the target word but then answers incorrectly 
(e.g. Auto; engl. “car”), whereupon the participant has up to 6 s to elicit a painful 
shock to the avatar by pressing a button with the right index fi nger. Failure to do 
so results in a text box appearing on the screen for 1.5 s instructing that pain 
must be applied whenever the avatar makes a mistake. The critical condition for 
analysis in this study then follows as the participant observes for 3 s the avatar’s 
suffering. In the non-pain trails, the avatar is simply observed after giving her 
correct answer. Both trial types conclude with a task-unspecifi c blank screen with 
fi xation cross presented for 6–8 s, after which the next trail begins. The avatar is 
visible for the duration of every trial, the timing of events (all jittered) over the 
course of each trial being designed to generate as realistically as possible the 
sense of a true interaction between participant and avatar.
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earned the  punishment or not). No instruction about the speed of 
the response was given but that the button must be pressed within 
6 s of the avatar giving its answer. The participant was also told that 
the predetermined volt intensity of the electric shock to be delivered 
in the event of a wrong answer would be shown at the beginning of 
each trial (75, 150, or 225 V), and that this cue could not be seen by 
the avatar. After giving instructions, the participant was reminded 
very clearly that the pain and the avatar exist only in a virtual and 
not in the real world and that withdrawal from the experiment is 
possible at any time; once in the scanner, participants were given an 
alarm button to hold in the left hand throughout data registration 
with which termination of the experiment could be signalled.
Each scanning session consisted of three experimental runs of 25 
trials each. The visual stimuli were presented using the “VisuaStim – 
Digital” MRI-compatible head-mounted display (Resonance 
Technology Inc.), using visual mono display with resolution of 
800 × 600 and 30° fi eld of view. In each run there were 7 non-pain 
trials and 18 pain trials, 6 for each of the three levels of intensity. The 
sequence of trials was pseudo-randomised under the constraint that 
no two trials of same shock intensity were presented in sequence. 
The timing of events within each trial was designed to generate 
as realistically as possible the sense of a true interaction between 
participant and avatar. All events in the trials were jittered. At the 
beginning of each trial (see Figure 1), a cue was presented for 1.5 s 
to indicate the predetermined intensity of the electric shock to be 
administered as punishment. The word pair was then presented and, 
after considering its response, the avatar gave either a correct or an 
incorrect answer (2.5–4.5 s after presenting the words). Following 
this, the participant had up to 6 s to press the appropriate button. 
After pressing the button for a correct answer the avatar was simply 
viewed for a further 6–8 s. If however punishment was delivered 
after an incorrect answer, the subsequent suffering of the avatar 
was observed. The suffering was conveyed by cues of pain-related 
behaviour (scream, facial expression of pain and corresponding 
movement of head posture and upper torso) at one of three pos-
sible levels of pain intensity. The stimuli for the three levels of pain 
intensity were originally selected on the basis that the different levels 
of visual and acoustic intensity were clearly distinguishable accord-
ing to behavioural ratings. Failure to apply pain when punishment 
was due resulted in a stern reminder appearing on the screen in a 
text box for 1.5 s duration, demanding that pain be applied whenever 
the avatar makes a mistake. After observing the avatar in pain for 
3 s, the avatar was viewed for a further 3–5 s during which time the 
avatar showed no pain-related behaviour. To ensure that the fMRI 
signal could return to a task-unspecifi c baseline, a blank screen with 
a fi xation cross was subsequently presented for both trial types for 
6–8 s after which the next trial began. Trials in which participants 
failed to respond appropriately were discarded in the data analyses. 
The total scanning time was approximately 35 min. Participants 
were debriefed after scanning about their experience during the 
social dilemma with particular reference to the impact of observing 
the avatar in pain.
fMRI DATA ACQUISITION AND ANALYSIS OF IMAGING DATA
Structural and functional images were acquired with a 3-T whole-
body MR unit (Philips Medical Systems, Best, The Netherlands) 
and eight-channel Philips SENSE head coil. Structural images of 
the entire brain using a T1-weighted three-dimensional, spoiled 
gradient echo pulse sequence (180 slices, TR = 20 ms, TE = 2.3 ms, 
fl ip angle = 20°, FOV = 220 mm × 220 mm × 135 mm, matrix 
size = 224 × 187, voxel size = 0.98 mm × 1.18 mm × 0.75 mm, res-
liced to 0.86 mm × 0.86 mm × 0.75 mm). Functional images were 
acquired from 225 whole-head scans per run using a Sensitivity 
Encoded (SENSE) (Pruessmann et al., 1999) single-shot echo-
planar imaging technique (repetition time, TR = 2.5 s; echo time, 
TE = 35 ms; fi eld of view = 220 mm × 220 mm × 132 mm; fl ip 
angle = 78°; matrix size = 80 × 80; voxel size = 2.75 mm × 2.75
 mm × 4 mm, resliced to 1.72 mm × 1.72 mm × 4 mm). Three 
dummy scans at the beginning of each run were acquired and dis-
carded in order to establish a steady state in T1 relaxation for all 
functional scans.
fMRI DATA ANALYSIS
MATLAB 2006b (Mathworks Inc., Natick, MA, USA), and the SPM5 
software package (http://fi l.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm) were used for pre-
processing and MRI data analysis. All images were realigned to the 
fi rst recorded volume, normalised into standard stereotactical space 
(using the EPI-template provided by the Montreal Neurological 
Institute, MNI brain), resliced to 2 mm × 2 mm × 2 mm voxel 
size and smoothed using a 6-mm full-width-at-half-maximum 
Gaussian kernel. Activated voxels were identifi ed by a general 
linear model (Friston et al., 1995) implemented in SPM5. First, 
a statistical model for each subject was computed and high-pass 
fi ltering applied (cut-off 128 s). We separately modelled the “pain” 
and “non-pain” trials, modelling the epoch as beginning with the 
button press and lasting in both trial types for 3 s. The design matrix 
included also regressors for the initial cue at the beginning of each 
trial indicating the intensity of the shock that participants would 
expect to have to elicit. All regressors were convolved with SPM’s 
canonical hemodynamic response function.
To investigate the contrast of interest, that is, brain areas show-
ing regionally specifi c effects of observing the avatar in pain, the 
estimates derived from the fi rst level (fi xed-effects) analysis of the 
pain condition were compared with the non-pain condition, thus 
producing a statistical parametric map of the t statistic SPM {t} of 
values for each voxel with which to test for the condition effects. 
For this, linear contrasts were applied for each voxel for each subject 
(Friston et al., 1995), this resulting in one statistical parametric 
map for the contrast for each subject. We were further interested 
in identifying brain regions that show a monotonic dependency 
in hemodynamic response over the three different levels of pain 
trail types (i.e., 75, 150, or 225 V) and their corresponding inten-
sity of pain-related behaviour and affect expression of the avatar. 
Additional contrasts were therefore employed, modelling a linear 
dependency between hemodynamic responses and the three levels 
of pain. All contrast images were smoothed using a 8-mm FWHM 
Gaussian kernel. Second-level analysis was performed to compare 
activation values between the pain and non-pain conditions using 
one-sample random effects t-statistics across subjects to allow for 
population inferences.
Guided by previous neuroimaging studies of signifi cant changes 
in the hemodynamic response to pain experience, dynamic facial 
expressions of pain, and empathy for pain (e.g., Simon et al., 2006; 
Lamm et al., 2007a), we defi ned for the observation of the  avatar 
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in pain a priori regions of interest (ROI) that included amygdala, 
ACC, Insula, somatosensory cortices (SI and SII/posterior insula), 
inferior frontal cortex (IFG), supplementary motor area (SMA), 
premotor cortex (PMC), and fusiform gyrus. To explore a broad 
range of effects in the data, voxels are reported that survived sig-
nifi cance thresholding at p < 0.001, uncorrected for multiple com-
parisons with a spatial extent threshold of k = 10 voxel. Activations 
found in these regions of interest are reported in Table 1. The used 
statistical threshold in this contrast is higher and thus more con-
servative than in other studies exploring emotional brain responses 
(e.g., Hamann and Mao, 2002).
To explore whether brain activity during observation of the 
avatar in pain covaried with individual differences in behavioural 
data of dispositional Empathic Concern, Personal Distress, and 
Fantasy (as well as Perspective Taking, Neuroticism, and Anxiety), 
the scores from the corresponding measures were entered separately 
in the GLM as covariates in the second level random effects analy-
sis. To ensure that disposition-related differences in neural activity 
were orthogonal to the pain > non-pain contrast and to avoid a 
large quantity of false positives, the same a priori defi ned regions 
of interest as used for the pain > non-pain contrast were applied 
in this analysis. Given the “make-believe” nature of the pain and 
suffering in this study, we defi ned also a priori regions associated 
in a previous study (Jackson et al., 2006) with imagined pain in an 
artifi cial limb. These regions were medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC), 
posterior cingulate cortex, and inferior parietal lobule, and we 
report activations within these ROIs also for the pain < non-pain 
contrast. Voxels are reported that survived signifi cance thresholding 
at p < 0.001, uncorrected for multiple comparisons with a spatial 
extent threshold of k = 10 voxel. In Table 2, only activations found 
in these a priori regions are reported. Activations falling outside 
these ROIs are not reported or interpreted.
RESULTS
BEHAVIOURAL DATA
To test whether participants responded differently in this dilemma 
as a function of shock intensity, a mixed-effects ANOVA was per-
formed. Greenhouse-Geisser adjustment was applied to correct the 
degrees of freedom for violation of the assumption of sphericity. 
The analysis revealed a signifi cant interaction between condition 
(volt level: 0, 75, 150, and 225) and reaction time (RT) [F(1.36, 
20.42) = 24.9, p = < 0.001]. The tests of within-subject contrasts 
showed a signifi cant difference in RT between pressing the response 
button that elicited no shock and pressing the button that elicited a 
shock of 75 V [F(1,15) = 31.71 p = <  0.001], 150 V [F(1,15) = 25.79 
p = <  0.001], or 225 V [F(1,15) = 28.71 p = <  0.001], such that the 
RT was shorter for the non-pain condition in which no shock was 
elicited. There were no signifi cant differences between the  different 
levels of shock (see Figure 2). All but two of the participants pressed 
the shock button correctly in all trials. One participant failed to 
Table 1 | Regions of signifi cant activation during observation of the avatar in pain compared with no pain in a priori defi ned regions of interest. 
Coordinates in MNI space and maximum t values are shown for local voxel maxima in each cluster (SPM{t} maps thresholded at p < 0.001 uncorrected for 
multiple comparisons, with a cluster extent threshold of 10 voxels).
Region of activation BA L/R/M x y z Max t value Cluster size
Superior frontal gyrus 10 R 12 56 30 5.92 370
º Superior frontal gyrus 9/10 R 18 52 42 5.73 
º Superior frontal gyrus 10 M 0 56 28 5.05 
Superior frontal gyrus 8 L −10 48 48 7.19 259
º Superior frontal gyrus 8 L −20 42 48 4.04 
Precentral gyrus 4 R 42 −10 52 4.71 142
º Dorsal premotor cortex 6 R 38 −14 44 4.25 
º Precentral gyrus 4 R 46 −10 60 4.17 
Dorsal premotor cortex 6 R 20 −12 74 4.20 11
Uncus/temporal pole of STG 28/38 R 32 6 −24 5.67 269
º Amygdala  R 16 −4 −20 3.98 
Posterior cingulate 31 R 18 −64 −8 4.08 426
º Parahippocampal gyrus 30/27 L −12 −40 −8 3.92 
º Parahippocampal gyrus 30 L −16 −50 −2 3.39 
Inferior frontal gyrus (oper.) 44 R 50 44 2 5.01 97
º Inferior frontal gyrus (orb.) 47 R 54 36 −2 4.42 
º Inferior frontal gyrus (orb.) 47 R 52 38 −12 3.98 
Inferior frontal gyrus (orb.) 47 R 34 30 −18 5.38 67
º Inferior frontal gyrus (orb.) 47 R 42 26 −16 4.81 
Inferior frontal gyrus (orb.) 47 L −48 24 −2 8.11 243
Fusiform gyrus 19/37 L −46 −54 −26 5.51 351
º Fusiform gyrus 18/19 L −38 −74 20 4.98 
º Cerebellum, decline  L −40 −66 22 4.95 
°, subpeaks of a cluster; BA, approximate Brodmann area; L, left hemisphere; R, right hemisphere; M, medial activation; STG, superior temporal gyrus; MTG, medial 
temporal gyrus; oper., opercularis; orb., orbitalis.
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elicit pain of 150 and 250 V on three trails in the fi rst and second 
run, and the other did not trigger fi ve 150 and fi ve 250 V shocks 
in the fi rst run.
IMAGING DATA
Network of areas involved in the observation of the avatar in pain
The fi rst analysis sought to establish the pattern of activation 
associated with the perception of the avatar’s cues of pain-related 
bodily and facial expression and pain vocalisation. For this, the 
pain > non-pain contrast revealed activations within a number of 
the a priori regions of interest, as shown in Table 1.
Predominantly right-sided activity was found in areas asso-
ciated with detecting and evaluating affective information. This 
included amygdala (see Figure 3A) within a cluster that also 
encompassed the uncus and temporal pole of the superior tem-
poral gyrus. There was also activation in ventrolateral parts of infe-
rior frontal gyrus (IFG) (see Figure 3B), most prominently right 
and left opercular IGF (BA47) and right orbital IFG (BA44), and 
activation in posterior cingulate in a cluster including retrosple-
nial cortex and posterior parahippocampus. Activation of motor 
areas was limited to the dorsal premotor cortex (PMC) (BA6) and 
precentral gyrus (BA4). The analysis showed activation in BA8 
of the superior frontal gyrus and in the rostral prefrontal cortex 
(BA10) (see Figure 3C). There was also activation in the fusiform 
gyrus. No activity was found in the pain > non-pain contrast in 
areas often associated with affect sharing such as the ACC, insula, 
supplementary motor area (SMA) or pre-SMA, ventral PMC or 
Broca’s area in the left IFG, even at the very liberal threshold of 
p > 0.05. No differences in activation were found as a function of 
applied shock intensity.
Dispositional measures and brain activity during observation of 
avatar in pain
Changes in neuronal activity during perception of the avatar in pain 
covaried linearly with the scores from the Distress, Neuroticism, 
Anxiety, and Fantasy scales, such that higher trait scores were associ-
ated with increasing neuronal activity in the areas shown in Table 2. 
The scores on the Empathic Concern and Perspective Taking scales 
of the IRI failed to predict any single voxel of change in neuronal 
activity, even at the very liberal threshold of p < 0.05.
Table 2 | Sites of activation related to Distress, Fantasy, Neuroticism and Anxiety in a priori defi ned regions of interest. Coordinates in MNI space and 
maximum t values are shown for local voxel maxima in each cluster (SPM{t} maps thresholded at p < 0.001 uncorrected for multiple comparisons, with a 
cluster extent threshold of 10 voxels).
Region of activation BA L/R/M x y z Max t score Cluster size
DISTRESS
Superior frontal gyrus 10 R 14 52 26 5.45 34
Inferior frontal gyrus (tri.) 45 R 42 30 14 5.73 332
° Inferior frontal gyrus (orb.) 47 R 52 34 −2 4.66 
Inferior frontal gyrus (orb.) 47 R 28 32 −14 5.39 21
Uncus 28 L −16 −10 −16 5.26 91
° Amygdala  L −18 −2 −12 4.43 12
FANTASY       
Superior frontal gyrus 9/10 R 16 46 38 4.35 19
SMA 6 L −8 −14 54 4.82 27
NEUROTICISM       
Superior frontal gyrus 10 R 14 48 36 5.16 19
Inferior frontal gyrus (oper.) 44 R 48 42 4 4.75 38
ACC 32 M −2 46 10 4.99 80
ACC 32 M 0 48 12 4.22 20
ACC 24 M −6 24 26 4.14 12
Anterior VMPFC 10 M 2 54 −6 4.19 11
Middle frontal gyrus 9 L −20 38 42 4.08 10
SMA 6 R 8 −12 56 6.94 312
° SMA 6 R 6 −4 66 5.52 
° SMA 6 M −2 −12 70 4.60 
BIS 1 (ANXIETY)       
Inferior frontal gyrus (orb.) 47 L −54 24 12 7.19 241
° Middle frontal gyrus  9 L −50 16 30 6.73 
Inferior frontal gyrus (oper.) 44 R 62 12 16 4.46 34
Inferior frontal gyrus (orb.) 47 R 54 30 0 6.11 28
Amygdala  L −24 2 −16 4.34 24
tri., triangularis; VMPFC, ventromedial prefrontal cortex. Refer to Table 1 for other abbreviations.
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Distress, Neuroticism, and Fantasy (but not Anxiety) (see 
Figures 4B–D) covaried with activity in the rostral PFC (BA10) 
that spatially falls within the cluster of activity found in the same 
region in the pain > non-pain contrast (see Figure 4A). Fantasy did 
not covary with any other cluster identifi ed in the pain > non-pain 
contrast, but it did covary with SMA. Neuroticism also covaried 
with SMA and ACC (see Figure 5A). Distress (see Figure 5B) and 
Anxiety were related to left amygdala. Distress was also associ-
ated with activation in right orbital (BA47) and triangular (BA45) 
IFG, whereas Anxiety predicted activation in left and right orbital 
(BA47) (see Figure 5C) and right opercular (BA44) IFG.
DISCUSSION
This exploratory study took a simple approach to gaining fi rst 
insight into the complex interplay of social and emotional process-
ing in a VR-based version of Milgram’s obedience dilemma. For 
this, we adapted as faithfully as possible the virtual stimuli of Slater 
et al.’s study for use within the constraints of fMRI methodology. 
Given the obvious virtual nature of the interpersonal setting, the 
victim and her pain, we asked whether observation of the avatar 
in pain does evoke brain activity consistent with an aversive state 
of personal distress or with empathic concern for the avatar. The 
results show that the perception of the avatar’s combined pain-
related bodily and facial expression and pain vocalisation evoked 
neuronal activity in a distributed network of brain areas known 
to be involved in affective processing, but not with those areas 
commonly reported in other studies of pain-related affect shar-
ing and empathy. Supported by the exploration of whether and 
which of these regions were modulated by dispositional behavioural 
 tendencies, the overall fi ndings are consistent with the idea that 
this paradigm induced an aversive state of personal distress and 
not empathic concern.
Davis (1996) put forward the view that personal distress may be 
a simple reactive response to another’s display of extreme distress 
without representing the other’s state. A fast, involuntary affective 
response was most probably elicited by the observation of the ava-
tar’s audio-visual display of pain-related behaviour and expressed 
affect, regardless of whether the avatar was experienced as actually 
having an emotional state. Several studies have reported activation 
of structures such as the amygdala by negatively valenced stimuli, 
including images of human injury and graphic violence, but with-
out activation consistent with empathy-related processing (e.g., 
Hamann and Mao, 2002; Schienle et al., 2006). At debriefi ng, 
most participants described the emotional display of the avatar 
as conveying anger, and two reported having perceived overtones 
of fear in her pain-related affect. Anger and fear are understood 
as distress emotions (see e.g., Berenbaum et al., 1995, 2003), and, 
importantly, the morphology of the facial expression of acute 
pain is very similar to that of anger and to a lesser degree fear 
(see e.g., Williams, 2002). In fact, the pattern of brain activa-
tions found in this study does mirror in part that reported by 
Pichon et al. (2008) in their study of dynamic bodily expression 
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FIGURE 2 | Mean reaction time for pain and non-pain button responses. 
A mixed-effects ANOVA (Greenhouse-Geisser adjusted) revealed a signifi cant 
interaction between condition [volt level: 0 (i.e., non-pain condition), 75, 150, 
and 225] and reaction time (RT) [F(1.36,20.42) = 24.9, p = < 0.001]. Within-
subject contrasts showed a signifi cant difference in RT between the non-pain 
condition and the pain condition as a whole, with shorter RT for the non-pain 
condition, but no signifi cant differences between the shock levels within the 
pain condition.
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FIGURE 3 | Signifi cant hemodynamic activity during observation of 
avatar in pain compared with not in pain. Observing the avatar in pain 
compared with no pain evoked differences in brain activation in the right 
amygdala and periamygdala areas (A), IFG (B), and bilateral rostral PFC (rPFC) 
(C). Images are superimposed on the coronal and sagittal sections of the 
single subject structural MNI template.
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of anger. Interestingly, their study found no differential activity in 
ACC and insula activity in the comparison of anger and neutral 
expression. Irrespective of these considerations, it is important 
to note that a simple reactive response to the negatively valenced 
display of the avatar may well have occurred independently of the 
other events in the paradigm and of those mechanisms of obedi-
ence that this paradigm is intended to induce. But, given that the 
anticipation and subsequent perception of the victim in pain is a 
vital  component of Milgram’s social dilemma, the nature of the 
participant’s response to pain-related behaviour in this paradigm 
is important for understanding obedience.
It is possible that a shared representation of affect was elicited 
by the perception of the avatar and her apparent pain. This would 
assume that the avatar’s behaviour was represented and processed 
as if communicating an internal affective state. This is plausible 
given that the audio-visual stimuli were carefully designed to vividly 
and dynamically convey pain-related behaviour and spontaneous 
affect in a real-time interactive manner as consistent as possible 
with human experience, and that affect sharing may be induced 
even though the participant knows that the target of noxious stimu-
lation can actually feel nothing (Lamm et al., 2007b). Assuming 
that processes of affect sharing are engaged, Decety and Jackson 
(2004) propose that it is the failure to apply suffi cient self-regulatory 
 emotional control over the shared state that leads to the experience 
of emotional distress or emotional contagion. The latter is an affec-
tive state that matches the other’s emotional display (Decety and 
Meyer, 2008), and de Waal (1996) proposes that cognitive failure to 
correctly attribute shared affect to the eliciting source (i.e., no self-
other distinction) can lead to emotional contagion. The cognitive 
components of empathy, which are thought necessary for the expe-
rience of empathic concern, are suggested to include the abilities to 
correctly attribute and effectively regulate shared affect as well as 
to adopt the perspective of the other (Decety and Jackson, 2004). 
But our measures of empathic concern and perspective taking did 
not predict any brain activation. Taken together, and while keeping 
in mind the exploratory nature of the fi ndings, the makeup of the 
neural network reported in this study may refl ect the basic pattern 
of brain activation underlying self-oriented distress upon witness-
ing the pain of one’s victim within the context of the obedience 
paradigm. This pattern has a number of main features.
Observing the avatar in pain elicited greater activation in the 
right amygdala. The amygdala is associated with feelings of fear 
and anxiety in response to electrical stimulation (Halgren et al., 
1978), with the processing of facially (Adolphs et al., 1994; Breiter 
x = 54x = –1 
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z = –18 
SMA
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FIGURE 5 | Correlated dispositional measures and brain activity during observation of avatar in pain. Prediction of hemodynamic changes in activation during 
observation of the avatar in pain versus no pain by scores of Neuroticism (A), Distress (B) and Anxiety (C), superimposed on the coronal and sagittal sections of the 
single subject structural MNI template.
y = 52y = 52 rostral PFC y = 50
Distress FantasyPain vs. non-pain  A B C DNeuroticism
rostral PFC y = 45
FIGURE 4 | Correlated dispositional measures and rostral PFC activity during observation of avatar in pain. The activation of the rostral PFCin the pain vs. non-
pain contrast is shown in (A), and, as found in the subsequent analysis, the prediction by scores of Personal Distress (B), Neuroticism (C), and Fantasy (D) of change 
in hemodynamic response in rostral PFC during observation of the avatar in pain, superimposed on the coronal sections of the single subject structural MNI 
template.
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et al., 1996; Calder et al., 1996) and vocally conveyed expression 
of threat, fear and anger (Scott et al., 1997; Phillips et al., 1998; 
Isenberg et al., 1999), and with dynamic bodily expression of fear 
(Grezes et al., 2007) and anger (de Gelder et al., 2004). In contrast 
to our fi nding of amygdala activation, Simon et al. (2006) report 
amygdala deactivation during viewing of dynamic pain expression 
of natural female faces. They suggest that this may refl ect the sup-
pression of avoidance and the mobilisation of helping behaviour, 
which in turn is an important precondition for empathic concern 
(Decety and Moriguchi, 2007). And, Petrovic et al. (2004) propose 
that deactivation in the amygdala during direct pain (e.g., Petrovic 
et al., 1999) may stem from top-down regulation of aversive per-
sonal distress in a “no-escape” situation. These suggestions echo 
the established importance of the amygdala as a target of adaptive 
voluntary regulation of negative affect (e.g., Schaefer et al., 2002; 
Ochsner et al., 2004; Beauregard et al., 2006), for which ante-
rior cingulate cortex (ACC) and ventrolateral  prefrontal cortex 
(VLPFC) (BA47) play a prominent role. For instance, successful 
cognitive reinterpretation of threat-related stimuli as a means to 
attenuating negative affect is associated with deactivation of the 
right amygdala and increased activation in the ventral and dorsal 
prefrontal cortex, including ACC (Ochsner et al., 2002; see also 
Eippert et al., 2007). Another such strategy entails cognitively 
evaluating the level of realism of fearful and threatening stimuli as 
either artifi cial or natural, this also resulting in attenuation of right 
amygdala activation and an increase in the response of the ACC 
and right prefrontal cortex, including BA47 (Hariri et al., 2003). 
The impact on empathic experience of consciously  reappraising 
the context in which pain-related stimuli are perceived is well 
documented (e.g., de Vignemont and Singer, 2006; Jackson et al., 
2006; Singer et al., 2006; Lamm et al., 2007a). While our fi nd-
ings show that observation of the avatar’s pain-related behaviour 
evoked activation in right and left orbital (BA47) and right oper-
cular (BA44) VLPFC, there was no evidence of any ACC activation 
in the comparison of the pain and non-pain conditions.
A modulatory role for affective processing has been implicated 
in right VLPFC in association also with regulating or suppressing 
pain-related negative affect and distress (Petrovic and Ingvar, 2002; 
Wager et al., 2004; Lieberman et al., 2007), and with actively ignor-
ing angry voices (Sander and Scheich, 2001). In fact, right amygdala 
and BA47 appear to be functionally associated in responding to 
angry and fearful faces such that the activation of BA47 is con-
versely related to that of the amygdala (Hariri et al., 2000, 2003; 
Nomura et al., 2004). Nomura et al. (2004) found that this region 
is associated with conscious evaluation of affective expression. The 
right BA47 is sensitive to both the observation and experience of 
pain (Lamm et al., 2007a), to static pictures of anger expression 
(Blair and Curran, 1999), dynamic fearful body expression (Grezes 
et al., 2007), angry and fearful tone of voice (Wildgruber et al., 
2005) – which also activates right opercular BA44 – and nonlinguis-
tic vocalisations of female cries and fearful screams (Fecteau et al., 
2005). While participants reported great diffi culty ignoring the 
painful cries of the avatar, the actual nature of the functional bal-
ance between BA47 and amygdala in this study is unclear. Activation 
of this right orbital area was predicted by dispositional distress.
The ACC and insula have been linked with the affective and 
motivational components of processing another’s perceived pain 
(Morrison et al., 2004; Singer et al., 2004, 2006; Botvinick et al., 
2005; Jackson et al., 2005, 2006). But we found no differential acti-
vation of these structures in the pain and non-pain comparison. It 
is possible that this paradigm evoked an unspecifi c aversive state of 
arousal, possibly associated with distress and anxiety (Eisenberg, 
2000; Critchley et al., 2004) and a state of avoidance (Decety et al., 
2007), across the pain and non-pain conditions, and that this state 
was related also to other events and subjective experiences within 
the paradigm and not just the observation of pain. In keeping 
with the preceding considerations, one interpretation would be 
that ACC and insula were not differentially engaged in processing 
and regulating negative affect specifi cally in response to observ-
ing the avatar in pain compared with her not in pain. Failure to 
down-regulate arousal can lead to distress (Decety and Moriguchi, 
2007), associated overarousal (Eisenberg et al., 1994), and feelings 
of fearfulness and anxiety (Davis, 1996). In contrast, top-down 
regulation of arousal elicited by the observation of the affective state 
of another is thought necessary to experience empathy (Eisenberg, 
2000; Decety and Jackson, 2006; Decety and Moriguchi, 2007). 
Individual differences in neuroticism did however predict change 
in brain activation of the ACC during observation of pain, this 
possibly refl ecting trait-consistent differences in the experience of 
negative affect and maladaptive coping and regulation of affect dur-
ing exposure to cues of threat and punishment; this awaits further 
investigation.
The perception of the avatar in pain also evoked activation in the 
left orbital (BA47) VLPFC. This area is responsive to  observation 
of oral articulatory movements (Buccino et al., 2004) and voiced 
speech production (Schulz et al., 2005), and, like its right homo-
logue, to non-linguistic vocalisations such as cries and fearful 
screams (Fecteau et al., 2005) and to observation of fearful body 
expressions (de Gelder et al., 2004). Saarela et al. (2007) found acti-
vation in this region in response to the presentation of faces express-
ing intense pain. This area is responsive also to negatively valenced 
words (e.g., suicide, victim) (Engels et al., 2007) and is involved in 
giving meaning to linguistic speech (Petersen et al., 1990; Dapretto 
and Bookheimer, 1999). It is possible that this region’s activation 
was related in this study to giving meaning to the alarming pain-
related visual and auditory cues. The neighbouring left areas of 
Broca (BA44) and premotor cortex (BA6) are associated with the 
role of the IFG in observing, imitating and comprehending action 
and are underpinned by the system of motor mirror neurons (e.g., 
Rizzolatti et al., 2001; Rizzolatti and Craighero, 2004) that, in turn, 
is thought by some to facilitate affect sharing by automatically 
 simulating the affective behaviour of others (Decety and Jackson, 
2004; Gallese et al., 2004). We found no activation in these regions 
of action representation in the pain vs. non-pain contrast.
While the orbital part of left VLPFC was associated with the 
measure of personal distress in Saarela et al.’s (2007) study, we 
found an association with trait anxiety in this region. Anxiety (and 
distress) also predicted activation in the left amygdala. The anxiety 
scale was used in this study to assess self-reported experience of 
behavioural inhibition in response to environmental punishment 
cues. The behavioural inhibition system (BIS) is thought to be 
mobilised when active avoidance of threat is perceived as inef-
fective or not possible in a perceived no-escape situation (Gray, 
1982). Activation of the amygdala in the context of pain, distress 
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and non-escape has been suggested by Petrovic et al. (2004). In 
fact, the obedience paradigm is suggested to induce the subjective 
perception of diminished personal control (Milgram, 1974). In 
this connection, activation of the SMA might be a point of inter-
est. It has been suggested that fear-induced contagion is allied 
with the preparation of action in response to the perception of 
another person’s threatening situation and that this preparatory 
response principally recruits the supplementary motor area (SMA) 
and pre-SMA (de Gelder et al., 2004). This idea fi nds support in that 
the SMA is implicated in linking unpleasant emotions with motor 
action in response to aversive stimuli (Oliveri et al., 2003) and that 
the pre-SMA is responsive to the arousal levels of affective signals 
(Warren et al., 2006). We found no pre-SMA or SMA activation 
in the pain vs. non-pain contrast. This may be attributable to the 
situation being perceived as inescapable and to processes of behav-
ioural inhibition: The BIS responds to signals of fear and danger 
by inhibiting motor behaviour, increasing arousal and enhancing 
attention to threat. But neuroticism and fantasy were associated 
with changes in activation of the SMA, suggesting at least that any 
activation in this region during observation of pain was modulated 
to some degree by individual differences in these dispositions.
We suggest that our fi ndings are consistent with the idea that this 
paradigm induced an aversive state of personal distress and not one 
of empathic concern. But distress and empathy could conceivably 
occur concurrently in the VR-based obedience paradigm, meaning 
that the suggested absence of empathy needs to be addressed. All 
but two of the participants complied fully with the  requirement 
to administer pain to the avatar. It is therefore possible that the 
 participants generally submitted to the perceived authority of 
the experimenter and did so for example in way consistent with 
Milgram’s (1974) proposed agentic shift of responsibility. The relin-
quishment of personal responsibility for the welfare of the victim 
may lead to a down-regulation of empathic experience. One poten-
tial reason for this high level of compliance is that the experimenter 
in the paradigm, one of the authors, may have been perceived by 
the participants as highly persuasive in his role as the expert or 
authority. If so, this would highlight also the importance of the 
‘real’ components of the VR-based dilemma in augmenting obedi-
ence. Another possibility is that the participants may have identifi ed 
with their role as punisher, effectively sanctioning the active use 
of excessive aggression. But the individual scores of the NEO-FFI 
personality dimension ‘social agreeableness’ indicate that all par-
ticipants report the tendency to use non hostile-aggressive means 
to resolving social confl ict. That the measure of empathic concern 
did not predict any brain activation may simply stem from the 
explicit instruction before entering the scanner that the pain and 
the avatar existed only in a computer-generated world. Once in the 
scanner, this information was underscored throughout the course 
of the experiment by the obvious virtual nature of the visual stimuli, 
and the participants may have proceeded through the task without 
losing sight of the fact that the avatar knows in reality no pain. 
But explicit knowledge that another person is transiently insensi-
tive to painful stimulation is in itself not enough to inhibit brain 
activity associated with pain-related affect sharing and empathy 
(Lamm et al., 2007b), and very unrealistic cartoon-based depic-
tions of affective situations have been used to demonstrate brain 
activity associated with empathy and theory of mind processing 
(Völlm et al., 2006). On the other hand, awareness of the realism 
of painful situations depicted in the form of real or make-believe 
cartoon images is associated with a relative attenuation of brain 
activity that is, nevertheless, thought to be empathy-related (Gu 
and Han, 2007).
Importantly, this VR-based paradigm is understood as a 
“ playful” rehearsal of a potentially real, novel, but dangerous situ-
ation without the participant having to incur the cost of causing 
harm or life-threatening injury (for this view on play, see e.g., Aldis, 
1975). As playful rehearsal, the mechanisms underlying obedience 
and the response to viewing the avatar in pain may not therefore 
be fully engaged or may be altered in some way. But in playful 
rehearsal there is the distinction between ‘role play’ as a form of 
pretence and play as non-pretence in which the game and the play-
er’s role is experienced as if for real (Steen and Owens, 2001). The 
fantasy scale predicted neural modulatory brain activity during 
observation of the avatar in pain. This scale measures the tendency 
to transpose oneself into fi ctional situations and the feelings of 
characters (Davis and Franzoi, 1991), and to imagine the potential 
outcome of such situations (Davis, 1983). Slater et al.’s study was 
related to the interest in presence. Presence may be understood as 
the subjective experience of feeling transiently unaware of actions 
and cognitions linked to the real environment while perceiving 
oneself as situated in and actually responding to events mediated 
by the virtual environment as if they were really happening (Wirth 
et al., 2007). The experience of fantasy and presence appear to 
require the capacity to selectively attend to current sensory input 
and to concomitantly suppress attending to internal or external 
stimuli that could confl ict with or trigger disengagement from 
that input (see also Slater, 2002; for further reading and fi ndings 
on neural mechanisms of presence, see Baumgartner et al., 2008; 
Jäncke et al., 2009), including cognitions concerning the medium 
by which this information is actually delivered to the senses and the 
knowledge that the perceived events are not real. This is consistent 
with the idea of plausibility in presence research. Plausibility refers 
to the illusion that the perceived events in the virtual world are 
really happening, even though the participant knows that they are 
not (Slater, 2009). This implies a sense of “informed consent” on 
the part of participants in engaging to a lesser or greater extent 
in this illusion.
The intention behind this study was to provide preliminary 
fi ndings and points of discussion to promote further neuroimag-
ing studies of behaviour in the obedience paradigm. Our simple 
approach to examining brain behaviour enabled us to capture a 
sense of the spatially distributed response of brain regions during 
observation of the avatar within the context of this partial repli-
cation of the obedient paradigm. How well the neural processes 
engaged in a true re-run of the original Milgram paradigm cor-
respond with those of our VR-based fi ndings may never be estab-
lished. Our approach focused on female participants only, and it 
was taken at the cost of controlling the many complex aspects of 
emotional and cognitive processing along the entire timeline of 
stimulus presentation and of controlling the impact of these on 
the time window of pain observation. Within this window itself, 
the differential infl uence of the specifi c elements of the visual and 
auditory pain-related display under conditions of obedient compli-
ance await further investigation.
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The fi ndings of this exploratory study are consistent with 
the idea that the VR-based obedience paradigm evoked a self-
oriented state of personal distress in response to observing the 
avatar in pain. This distress may be rooted in a simple involun-
tary response to the avatar’s pain behaviour and expression of 
negatively valenced affect, or it may refl ect poor self-regulatory 
control of the shared affect evoked by the perceived emotional 
state of the avatar. The results are consistent with the suggestion 
that the objective ‘reality’ of pain is of secondary importance in 
the experience of distress, and that a particular pattern of brain 
networks may underpin this experience. The many aspects of 
this social dilemma are still to be elucidated, but in throwing 
some light on the neural basis of one aspect of this dilemma and 
associated affective experience a starting point for more rigorous 
investigations has been established.
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